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INTRODUCTION
Eileen Goldberg was just one among 35,000 California
residents to get a letter from data broker ChoicePoint telling her
that her personal information had been stolen from the company.1
But perhaps distinguishing her from most of the other recipients,
Goldberg’s son, Michael, works for a Los Angeles class action law
firm, and Goldberg claims the dubious honor of being the first
person to file an action against ChoicePoint in the data breach
case.2 In this class action, filed just days after she was notified and
contrary to what generally has been allowed in identity theft
litigation in the past, the attorneys are seeking to include both
plaintiffs whose data was compromised and those whose
information appears not to have been used.3 Goldberg is a member
of the latter group, and her action seeks new standards for
ChoicePoint and the data broker business as a whole.4
Like Goldberg’s story, crimes involving the theft of personal
information receive a great deal of media attention. Almost daily,
there is a breach of some system where personal information,
customer records, credit card numbers, or debit card numbers have
fallen either into the wrong hands or out of the right hands.
This note attempts to classify the existing laws and rules that
have been applied to unauthorized data movements by looking at

1

Verne Kopytoff, 35,000 in State To Receive Warning Personal Information Stolen in
October, Georgia Firm Says, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 19, 2005, at A3; Patti Bond,
ChoicePoint: Plaintiffs Ready To Try New Angles, ATLANTA J. CONST., Apr. 8, 2005, at
F1.
2
Bond, supra note 1.
3
Id.
4
Id.
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the breadth of approaches. Part I will look at the existing laws and
rules, focusing on California and Florida law, as examples of two
different approaches. Part II will look at data breaches, suggesting
that they can be categorized into four types (negligence, crime, low
standards, and loss of control). Part III will conclude, relying on
the incidents and information coming before it, that it is not yet
time for a federal law on data protection, but instead that the states
and the courts need time to tease out the elements that will best
protect personal information. Part III will also assert that, while it
is easy to see data protection as a legal and political issue,
companies must assume responsibility for the protection of their
customers’ and clients’ data if the internet economy and internet
access to the traditional economy are to survive.
I. EXISTING LAWS AND RULES
A. What Is Privacy?
For the electronic economy to continue to grow, consumers and
businesses clamor for clearly defined and responsibly executed use
of personal data and associated activities. But what exactly
comprises privacy and what information—held by whom—should
be treated with respect for its “privacy” is a murky issue.5 For the
sake of this Note, privacy will be defined generally as those
attributes which constitute “personally identifiable information,”6
5

See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (2006);
see also Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087 (2002).
6
Personally identifiable information is a definition still in motion. The European
Union Data Protection Directive defines “personal data” as “any information relating to
an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable person is one
who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification
number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental,
economic, cultural or social identity.” Council Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on
the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the
Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 art. 2(a), at 38.
The California statutes define “personal information” as:
an individual’s first name or first initial and last name in combination with any
one or more of the following data elements, when either the name or the data
elements are not encrypted:
(1) Social security number.
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including (but not limited to) an individual’s name, address, phone
numbers, place of employment, credit card numbers, social
security number, health records, transactional records, or any other
identifying element with which another individual could act as
though he were the original person. These actions could be simple
and innocent, such as causing the delivery of marketing email, or
nefarious and extreme, such as the range of activities that
constitute identity theft.7 This information may be collected

(2) Driver’s license number or California Identification Card number.
(3) Account number, credit or debit card number, in combination with any
required security code, access code, or password that would permit access to an
individual’s financial account.
(f) For purposes of this section, “personal information” does not include
publicly available information that is lawfully made available to the general
public from federal, state, or local government records.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29(e)–(f) (2006).
Florida law defines “Personal identification information” as
any name or number that may be used, alone or in conjunction with any other
information, to identify a specific individual, including any:
1. Name, postal or electronic mail address, telephone number, social
security number, date of birth, mother’s maiden name, official state-issued
or United States-issued driver’s license or identification number, alien
registration number, government passport number, employer or taxpayer
identification number, Medicaid or food stamp account number, bank
account number, credit or debit card number, or personal identification
number or code assigned to the holder of a debit card by the issuer to
permit authorized electronic use of such card;
2. Unique biometric data, such as fingerprint, voice print, retina or iris
image, or other unique physical representation;
3. Unique electronic identification number, address, or routing code;
4. Medical records;
5. Telecommunication identifying information or access device; or
6. Other number or information that can be used to access a person’s
financial resources.
FLA. STAT. § 817.568.1(f) (2005).
7
Some of the literature combines discussion of the breach of information and the theft
of an identity, but this piece will focus on the data breach and the subsequent activity
with that, regardless of what comprises the activity. For a helpful list of identity theft
actions that resulted in criminal prosecution, see Lori J. Parker, Annotation, Validity,
Construction, and Application of State Statutes Relating to Offense of Identity Theft, 125
A.L.R.5TH 537 (2005).
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overtly or not in the course of business transactions, by the
government, or by non-profit organizations.8
The right to privacy has long confused and confounded average
Americans, who often presume a Constitutional right to privacy
that doesn’t explicitly exist.9 While most scholars accept that there
is some sort of derived right to some sort of privacy, “the right to
privacy has been poorly articulated and only vaguely theorized.”10
In contrast, in many European countries national privacy laws were
generally in place by the early 1990’s,11 with some dating back to
the 1970’s,12 and a European Union Directive has been in force for
more than a decade, setting minimum levels of national
legislation.13 Additionally, the European Union has a Directive on
Electronic Commerce that acts as the “legal framework” for ecommerce among member countries.14 The United States, on the
other hand, relies on a “sectoral . . . mix of legislation, regulation,

8

Vincent R. Johnson, Cybersecurity, Identity Theft, and the Limits of Tort Liability, 57
S.C. L. REV. 255, 255–56 (2005). These “entities . . . assemble, update, manage, and use
masses of computerized information relating to individuals.” Id. at 255. Johnson further
defines the data as including “names, relationships (e.g., family members and employers),
contact information (e.g., phone numbers, residences, and virtual addresses), personal
histories (e.g., birth dates, medical data, physical characteristics, and educational
records), official identifiers (e.g., social security, driver’s license, and passport numbers),
and financial records (e.g., bank, credit card, frequent flyer, and investment account
numbers).” Id. at 256.
9
See generally Oliver Ireland & Rachel Howell, The Fear Factor: Privacy, Fear, and
the Changing Hegemony of the American People and the Right to Privacy, 29 N.C. J.
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 671, 671–74, 688–89 (2004) (tracing through the case law and
outlines the major legislative elements that comprise the United States’ privacy laws); see
also PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW 29–90 (1996)
(discussing the Constitutional Law approach).
10
Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L.
REV. 1149, 1155 (2005).
11
PETER P. SWIRE & ROBERT E. LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS: WORLD DATA FLOWS,
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, AND THE EUROPEAN PRIVACY DIRECTIVE 23 (1998).
12
HARRY HENDERSON, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 36 (1999) (noting that
France, Germany, and Great Britain all enacted privacy regulations in the 1970’s).
13
Council Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with
Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995
O.J. (L 281) 31.
14
Directive on Electronic Commerce, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1. See, e.g., the European
Commission’s Electronic Commerce portal, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
internal_market/e-commerce/index_en.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2007).
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and self regulation”15 in privacy regulation that is “riddled with
gaps and weak spots.”16
B. Federal Privacy Laws
In the United States, legislation exists to address the use of
credit reports in the form of the Fair Credit Reporting Act,17 to
limit the personal information that state motor vehicle agencies can
release about licensees in the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act,18 to
control the information held on individuals by government
agencies and how it may be disclosed in the Privacy Act of 1974,19
and to govern the disclosure of medical information in the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.20 The federal
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) serves as the primary
means by which unauthorized access to computer systems,
including data access and theft cases, are prosecuted.21 Access
device fraud22 and wire fraud23 are similarly covered by federal
laws. The Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act,24 enacted in
July 2004, stiffens the penalty for use of another’s identification
during the commission of any of a list of more than a hundred
felonies, including wire fraud, misuse of a Social Security number,

15

See U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Safe Harbor Overview, available at
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/sh_overview.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2007). “The
European Union, however, relies on comprehensive legislation that, for example, requires
creation of government data protection agencies, registration of data bases with those
agencies, and in some instances prior approval before personal data processing may
begin.” Id.; see also U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Safe Harbor Documents, available at
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/sh_documents.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2007).
16
Daniel J. Solove & Chris J. Hoofnagle, A Model Regime of Privacy Protection, 2006
U. ILL. L. REV. 357, 357 (2006) [hereinafter Solove & Hoofnagle, Model Regime].
17
15 U.S.C.A. § 1681 (2006).
18
18 U.S.C. § 2721 (2000).
19
5 U.S.C.A. § 552a (2006).
20
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L.
No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 210 (2006)).
21
18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (2006).
22
18 U.S.C.A. § 1029 (2006).
23
18 U.S.C.A. § 1343 (2006).
24
18 U.S.C.A. § 1028A(a)(1), (c) (2006). For an overview, see MADELEINE
SCHACHTER, INFORMATIONAL AND DECISIONAL PRIVACY, PART II 199–518 (CAROLINA
ACADEMIC PRESS 2003).
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or passport fraud.25 Other laws address similar narrowly focused
issues.26 But there are also wide gaps where information is not
protected, and no single overriding consumer-targeted law exists
that protects the information stored by companies and the
government from abuse, or gives those whose information is
misused or abused a personal right of action.27 And that lack of a
safety net is affecting the behavior of American consumers, by
some estimates keeping as many as a third of those over the age of
fourteen from making purchases through the internet.28
C. Privacy in Online Activity
The consumer advocacy group the Privacy Rights
Clearinghouse warns consumers that “[o]ften the level of privacy
you can expect from an online activity will be clear from the nature
of that activity. Sometimes, however, an activity that appears to be
private may not be. There are virtually no online activities or
services that guarantee absolute privacy.”29 This message to
consumers is reiterated every day in news headlines, highlighting
the intersection between privacy and data security, and attacks on
the latter that result in the loss of privacy in the former.
Informational privacy has been defined as “the claim of
individuals, groups, and institutions ‘to determine for themselves
when, how, and to what extent information about them is
communicated to others.’”30
Understanding the increasing
25

Sean B. Hoar, Trends In Cybercrime: The Dark Side of the Internet, 20-FALL CRIM.
JUST. 4, 8 (2005).
26
INTERNATIONAL GUIDE TO PRIVACY 15–80 (Jody R. Westby ed., 2004). See,
generally, Ireland & Howell, supra note 9, at 674–88. There is extensive literature
tracing and distinguishing the existing federal laws. See, e.g., MADELEINE SCHACHTER,
supra note 24.
27
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (2006); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1029 (2006), 18 U.S.C.A. § 1343
(2006), 18 U.S.C.A. § 1028(a)(1), (c) (2006).
28
The Online Fear Factor: Phishing and Keylogging and Fraud. Oh, My!,
EMARKETER, Mar. 14, 2006, available at http://www.emarketer.com/Article.aspx?
1003865.
29
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Privacy in Cyberspace: Rules of the Road for the
Information Superhighway, http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs18-cyb.htm (last visited
Jan. 12, 2006) (emphasis in original).
30
RICHARD A. GLENN, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY: RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES UNDER THE LAW
205 (ABC-CLIO 2003) (citing ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (Atheneum
1967)).
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commoditization of this information, another scholar says that
“information privacy is concerned with the use, transfer, and
processing of the personal data generated in daily life.”31
Data protection and privacy are concepts conjoined both in
theory and in practical application.32 The interrelatedness is that:
Security involves the protection of information,
applications and operating systems, networks, and
hardware and supporting equipment. If networks can be
breached, information can be accessed; if applications or
operating systems can be manipulated, data can be
sabotaged or compromised; if information controls can be
broken, then information can be stolen, disclosed, or
compromised.
In part, security is about protecting
information from loss, misuse, unauthorized access,
disclosure, alteration, and destruction.33
The ChoicePoint breach, disclosed in February 2005,34 was a
tipping point in the discussion of privacy and the revelation of data
breaches, perhaps because it was of such great magnitude or
perhaps because it involved criminals barely posing as legitimate
data purchasers.35 Since February 14, 2005, the date of the
ChoicePoint disclosure, more than 100 million records containing
the personal information of U.S. residents have been
“compromised.”36 Nearly 19 million U.S. households had some
theft of personal information in 2006, in an estimated 303
incidents.37 Additionally, ChoicePoint alerted the public to the
massive and growing data broker business, and to the associated
data transfers about consumers and their behavior which these

31

Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055,
2058 (2004).
32
INTERNATIONAL GUIDE TO PRIVACY, supra note 26, at 136.
33
Id. at 136.
34
The Privacy Rights Clearinghouse Keeps a Tally of the Breaches Since ChoicePoint,
available at http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm.
35
See infra Part II.
36
The Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, A Chronology of Data Breaches,
http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2007).
37
The Identity Theft Resource Center, 2006 Disclosure of U.S. Data Incidents,
http://www.idtheftcenter.org/breaches.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2007).
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companies seek and store.38 One of the Acxiom profiler tools is
estimated to have collected information from at least 15 million
sources, covering 95 percent of American households; Experian
claims to cover 98 percent of households, with potentially more
than 1000 data points of information on each household.39 And not
only major businesses have access to their lists of households, as
the price points for such data are low, as inexpensive as $65 per
1000 names.40
Surveys of Americans and of online consumers emphasize their
concerns about the use of their information.41 “Information
sharing and collection have been going on for a long time, but I
think consumers are finally starting to get some awareness and
they do not like it,” a Federal Trade Commission attorney
presciently told a privacy panel at the University of Maine in the
summer of 2001.42 The notion that, even without explicit laws
regarding their data, responsible companies should treat
information with care is steadily emerging, indeed, “[t]here are
instances where there are no laws or regulations regarding the
privacy or security of certain information; however, there is a
public perception that disclosure of this type of data is not
acceptable.”43
D. Enforcement by Everyone
Data breaches and subsequent data theft or illegitimate use are
covered by a haphazard series of state laws, as well as enforcement
actions by Attorneys General and federal administrative agencies,
especially the Federal Trade Commission. But the recent story of
data security breaches in the United States is a bit of a chickenand-egg situation. Many of the large-scale breaches which have
38

See infra Part II.
Andrew J. McClurg, A Thousand Words Are Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort
Response to Consumer Data Profiling, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 65–66 (2003).
40
Richards, supra note 10, at 1157–58.
41
See Rita Heimes, Internet Privacy Law, Policy, and Practice: State, Federal, and
International Perspectives, 54 ME. L. REV. 95 (2002).
42
Id. at 103 (reporting a panel discussion that took place June 7–8, 2001 and quoting
Laura Mazzarella, attorney in the Division of Financial Practices of the Federal Trade
Commission’s Bureau of Consumer Protection).
43
See INTERNATIONAL GUIDE TO PRIVACY, supra note 26, at 156.
39
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come to the attention of the press and the public—including the
ChoicePoint incident—may be credited to legislation out of
California requiring the notification of California residents whose
personal information is breached.44 Of course, breaches large and
small occurred before the California legislation went into effect,
and it is likely that some companies have made the decision to take
the business risk of violating the California law—or more subtly
deciding an incident did not cause the notification requirement to
kick in—than risk the questions from those whose information was
revealed who live outside of California, from regulators,
stockholders; the dip in stock prices; the loss of customers and
clients; and the surrounding publicity.45 Estimates do suggest that
the number of security breaches is increasing; security breaches are
estimated to have occurred at between 80 and 90 percent of
Fortune 500 companies and government agencies.46
E. In the States
California was the first state to pass significant online breach
notification legislation, and, though the law has been criticized for
ambiguous
drafting
and
other
elements
considered
disadvantageous (especially to non-California-based companies), it
is nevertheless setting the standard by which subsequent state
legislation is being drafted.47
The California data breach
notification law was only one of several significant pieces of
online- or privacy-oriented consumer protection to come out of
that state’s legislature recently,48 and was the reaction to the
44
See Tyler Paetkau & Roxanne Torabian-Bashardoust, California Deals with Id Theft:
The Promise and the Problems, BUS. L. TODAY, May/June 2004, at 37.
45
See id.
46
Alexander Frid & Jeffrey M. Rawitz, Jones Day Commentaries: Security Breach
Notification Requirements: Guidelines and Securities Law Considerations (2006),
available at http://www.jonesday.com/pubs/pubs_detail.aspx?pubID=S3225 (last visited
Jan. 12, 2007).
47
See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.29, 1798.82 (2006). For criticisms, see Paetkau &
Torabian-Bashardoust, supra note 44.
48
The breadth of California legislation is dizzying, covering the transfer of information
to direct marketers, the publication of cell phone numbers in a directory, the use of Social
Security numbers on paychecks, the downloading of spyware, using medical information
about individuals to market to them, the use of data from GPS systems in rental cars,
among others. Though some of the other California legislation does touch on data
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hacking of a website that could have exposed all of the state’s
employees’ Social Security numbers.49 The hacker attack, which
involved data about more than 225,000 employees, was discovered
in early May.50 However, the individuals whose data was
compromised—and who included state legislators—were not
notified for several weeks.51 California, which shares the dubious
distinction with Washington, D.C., as the two places where the
most identity theft crimes take place,52 is traditionally very
protective of consumers, as well as the home of cutting-edge
technology legislation.53 In a nod to the fact that not all data is
held in electronic format, the legislature has considered expanding
the statute to include non-electronic data.54
1. California
The California law, the Security Breach Information Act, was
drafted, passed, and signed by Governor Gray Davis within four
months.55 The law, which went into effect July 1, 2003, defines
the personal information at issue as a person’s first name (or first
initial) and last name in combination with either the person’s
Social Security number; driver’s license number or California
privacy and information security, this piece focuses on the issue of breaches, and as such
is concerned only with CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.29 and 1798.82. For the other
legislation, see David Bender, Privacy Developments-2005, 11th Annual Institute on
Intellectual Property Law, 842 PLI/PAT 9 (2005) [hereinafter Bender, Privacy
Developments]; Barbara L. Delaney et al., California Privacy and Security Legislation
Affects Entire Nation, 3 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 21 (2005); Chad C. Coombs &
Keenen Milner, New California Identity Theft Legislation, L.A. LAWYER 21 (2004);
Paetkau & Torabian-Bashardoust, supra note 44.
49
See Robert Lemos, ‘Perfect Storm’ for New Privacy Laws?, CNETNEWS.COM, Mar.
1, 2005, available at http://news.com.com/Perfect+storm+for+new+privacy+laws/21001029_3-5593225.html.
50
See id.
51
See id.
52
Coombs & Milner, supra note 48, at 21.
53
See generally Delaney et al., supra note 48.
54
Kenneth M. Dreifach, Data Privacy, Web Security, and Attorney General
Enforcement, 6th Annual Institute on Privacy Law: Data Protection—The Convergence
of Privacy & Security, 828 PLI/PAT 401, 420.
55
Lemos, supra note 49. For more of the history of the passage of the California, see
Timothy H. Skinner, California’s Database Breach Notification Security Act: The First
State Breach Notification Law Is Not Yet a Suitable Template for National Identity Theft
Legislation, 10 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 14–39 (2003).
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Identification Card number; account number; credit or debit card
number, in combination with any code that would permit access to
a financial account and that isn’t available to the general public
from government records.56 It is not necessary that both elements
be unencrypted; either an unencrypted name or data would trigger
the statute.57 The definition of a breach is one of the elements that
is controversial—the “unencrypted personal information was, or is
reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized
person[,]”58 without regard for whether the information was
actually used. The California law applies to both private and
governmental entities.59 It additionally allows for a private civil
action by anyone harmed by a breach, and the law places no limits
on other claims under unfair business practices or
misrepresentation (regarding the privacy policies in place, for
example).60
The California law also specifies how a company must alert
customers of the breach, and, in one of the most criticized aspects
of the law, an ambiguously drafted statement of how quickly the
notification must take place.61 The disclosure must take place
within “most expedient time possible and without unreasonable
delay, consistent with the legitimate needs of law enforcement[.]”62
Notice must be written; or electronic in accordance with 15 U.S.C.
§ 7001 (concerning electronic records and signatures); or may be a
sort of substitute notice, if the cost of notice exceeds $250,000 or
that the number of people who must be notified is more than
500,000 or if their contact information is incomplete.63 Substitute
notice requires email for those the entity has email for;
“[c]onspicuous posting of the notice on the agency’s Web site
page, if the agency maintains one”; and “[n]otification to major
56

CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29(e)–(f) (2006).
Id. § 1798.29(e).
58
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(a) (2006).
59
Id. § 1798.29 (applying to any person or business); id. § 1798.82 (applying to any
California state agency); see also Dreifach, supra note 54, at 419.
60
Cheryl A. Falvey et al., Disclosure of Security Breaches Required by New California
Privacy Legislation, METRO. CORP. COUNS., Aug. 2003, at 5.
61
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29(a) (2006).
62
Id.
63
Id. § 1798.29(g).
57
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statewide media.”64 If the breaching entity has an “information
security policy” that states how and how quickly it will notify
customers of a breach, and that policy is not in conflict with the
California law, following that policy will suffice as complying
with the timely notification aspects of the statute.65
2. Florida
In a tale that is indicative of the conflict of openness of records
and the call for increasing privacy, Florida government officials
find themselves struggling to follow two seemingly contradictory
pieces of legislation—one which requires county recorders to make
available online a wide variety of public records, and another (set
to be enforced as of January 1, 2008, a deadline that has been
extended twice66) that limits the personal information placed
online.67 The old law meant that Social Security numbers, birth
dates, driver’s license information, passport numbers, green card
information, images of signatures, and bank account numbers of
current and former Florida residents were to be put online if they
were part of a public record, making the owners of the information
extremely vulnerable to identity theft; the new law mandates the
removal of “Social Security numbers, bank account numbers, and
credit and debit card numbers” from online public records.68 The
issue initially rose in Broward County in the spring of 2006, but
the data in question has been online since 1999, according to that
county’s director of records, who claims that the Broward exposure
is repeated around the country as local governments followed
policies to allow internet access to public records.69
Florida has another law that addresses the data security of
individuals under the criminal code, and is a useful contrast to the

64

Id. § 1798.29(g)(3).
Id. § 1798.29(h).
66
Monica Hatcher, Public Records Easy Targets for ID Thieves, MIAMI HERALD,
Aug. 27, 2006, at A1.
67
Jaikumar Vijayan, Update: Fla. Residents’ Data Exposure a Statewide Issue,
COMPUTERWORLD, Apr. 11, 2006, http://www.computerworld.com/securitytopics/
security/privacy/story/0,10801,110389,00.html.
68
Id.
69
Id.
65
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California law.70 Passed after the ChoicePoint breach, the
amendments to the “Criminal Use of Personal Identification
Information” statute went into effect July 1, 2005,71 and prescribe
criminal penalties for misusing others’ information,72 including
that of dead people.73 The Florida statute focuses on the criminal
aspect of data breaches, with the misuse quickly becoming a
felony.74
Florida requires that the victim “whose unencrypted personal
information was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired
by an unauthorized person,” be notified “without unreasonable
delay . . . [usually] no later than 45 days following the
determination of the breach.”75 A company’s failure to notify may
invoke a fine of up to $500,000 per breach,76 but the statute
exempts governmental agencies unless they have contracted with a
third-party to provide “governmental services,” in which case the
third-party can be liable for the fine without the ability to bill back
to the governmental agency.77 For third parties holding data for
businesses, breaches must be reported within ten days, or penalties
start to kick in.78 In Florida, “breach” means “unlawful and
unauthorized acquisition of computerized data that materially
compromises the security, confidentiality, or integrity of personal
information.”79 Victim notification provisions are very similar to
those in the California law,80 with law enforcement81 and data
protection policy carve-outs.82 But unlike California, if the data of
more than 1000 people is involved in a breach, the company must
notify “all consumer reporting agencies that compile and maintain

70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82

Compare FLA. STAT. § 817.568 (2005), with CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29(e).
H.R. 481, 2005 Leg., 107th Reg. Sess. (Fl. 2005).
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 817.568(2) (2005).
FLA. STAT. § 817.568(8)(a) (2005).
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.568(2).
FLA. STAT. § 817.5681(1)(a) (2005).
FLA. STAT. § 817.5681(1)(b) (2005).
See FLA. STAT. § 817.5681(1)(d).
FLA. STAT. § 817.5681(2)(a).
FLA. STAT. § 817.5681(4).
Compare FLA. STAT. § 817.5681(6), with CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29(g) (2006).
Compare FLA. STAT. § 817.5681(3), with CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29(c) (2006).
Compare FLA. STAT. § 817.5681(9), with CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29(h) (2006).
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files on consumers on a nationwide basis.”83 There is also the
addition of a clause that “notification is not required if, after an
appropriate investigation or after consultation with relevant
federal, state, and local agencies responsible for law enforcement,
the person reasonably determines that the breach has not and will
not likely result in harm to the individuals whose personal
information has been acquired and accessed.”84
3. Other State Laws
The California and Florida laws are now just two among the
many laws in an increasing list. As of July 2006, state security
breach laws were in effect in at least thirty-three states: Arkansas,
Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia (covers data brokers only), Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana
(covers state agencies only), Kansas (took effect Jan. 1, 2007),
Louisiana, Maine (applies to information brokers only), Minnesota
(law does not apply to financial institutions or HIPAA-covered
institutions), Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire (took
effect Jan. 1, 2007), New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma (covers state agencies only),
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island (does not include HIPAA-covered
institutions), Tennessee, Texas, Utah (took effect Jan. 1, 2007),
Washington, and Wisconsin.85 An additional protection for the
individual is the ability to act on the information that one’s identity
could be endangered. By summer 2006, according to the Public
Interest Research Group, twenty-five states had legislation that
allows or would be in force to allow consumers to place security
freezes on their credit reports.86 Five of those states require that
the consumer be a victim of identity theft (Hawaii, Kansas, South
Dakota, Texas and Washington, with Washington including

83

FLA. STAT. § 817.5681(12).
FLA. STAT. § 817.5681(10)(a) (emphasis added). “Such a determination must be
documented in writing and the documentation must be maintained for 5 years.” Id.
85
See State PIRG Summary of State Security Freeze and Security Breach Notification
Laws, http://pirg.org/consumer/credit/statelaws.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2007)
(maintaining a relatively up-to-date list of the status of state legislation on security breach
notification and freeze laws and links to most of the state legislation).
86
Id.
84
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consumers who have received notice of a breach).87 The other
twenty states are California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont and Wisconsin.88 This is
an increase over the twelve states that had laws in place that let
consumers restrict access to credit reports as of January 2006, and
up from four states with security freeze laws in place as of January
2005.89
Factors that differentiate the state laws include: whether the
breach victim must be notified in all cases or only in the case of
risk of some level or of actual harm;90 if a credit-reporting agency
must also be notified, and if so at what threshold of records;91 what
constitutes personal information covered by the law (and whether
it must be electronic in format);92 whether there is an individual
right of action or if the state Attorney General’s office or another
governmental entity must act;93 who must comply with the law (for
instance, must governmental agencies comply at the same level as
private enterprise, does the storage with a third party change the
application of the breach notification, who is the target of the
notification, etc.);94 whether the law addresses civil or criminal
repercussions;95 what opt-outs for federally covered information
exist (such as the Health Information Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) or the Graham-Leach-Bliley Act
(GLBA));96 if there is an associated ability to freeze access to

87

Id.
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 817.5681(12).
92
DOUG MARKIEWICZ, VIGILANTMINDS, STATE SECURITY BREACH LEGISLATION 4–5
(2006), http://www.vigilantminds.com/files/vigilantminds_state_security_breach_legisla
tion_whitepaper.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2007).
93
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 817.5681(11).
94
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 817.5681(10)(c).
95
Compare FLA. STAT. § 817.568 (LexisNexis 2005) (providing criminal penalties),
with FLA. STAT. § 817.5681 (providing administrative fines).
96
See State PIRG Summary of State Security Freeze and Security Breach Notification
Laws, http://pirg.org/consumer/credit/statelaws.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2007); see also
Kaustuv M. Das, Data Breach Notification Laws: The Changing Landscape in Early
88
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credit reports (this is often found in separate statute, but also has
several variants, such as whether the individual must have had
their identity stolen before the freeze can take place or if the freeze
may be prophylactic);97 how much and what sorts of effort must be
made to notify those whose information is breached;98 and how
quickly that notification must take place.99 Additionally, some of
the legislation interacts with old state statutes on unfair
competition.100 It is also unclear how state laws will interact with
the Fair Credit Reporting Act and parts of the GLBA.101
The requirement of some level of risk of use of the information
is not present in the California law, meaning that the breach
without any level of harm or risk of harm is in and of itself
actionable, and this is one of the elements that makes it one of the
toughest state laws.102 Levels of risk of use of the data required for
the statutes to kick in vary among the states, with no requirement
at all of any consideration of harm, to “reasonable” or even
“significant” risk and harm, injury, or loss all being among the
issues considered.103 Notification speed is generally vague, with
the exception of Florida and Ohio, which require notification
within forty-five days and New York, which specifies that state
agencies must notify potential victims within 120 days.104
The definition of personal information105 also varies widely
(mother’s maiden name, for instance, is personal information

2006, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE ADVISORY BULLETIN, Mar. 2006, available at
http://www.dwt.com/practc/privacy/bulletins/03-06_DataBreach.htm..
97
See id.
98
See MARKIEWICZ, supra note 92, at 5–6.
99
Id. at 6–7, Table 1 (comparing some of these and other attributes of the state laws).
100
See Das, supra note 96.
101
See Solove & Hoofnagle, Model Regime, supra note 16, at 380. “Most privacy
protections in America have been created by state legislatures.” Id. at 381. Solove and
Hoofnagle suggest that federal privacy legislation should focus on “‘floor preemption,’
thereby allowing states to innovate more comprehensive protections for individual
rights.” Id.
102
See Patti Waldmeir, Federal data security law reaches turning point in Congress,
FT.COM, Apr. 13, 2006, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/49315c58-ca6b-11da852f-0000779e2340.html.
103
MARKIEWICZ, supra note 92, at Table 1; see also Das, supra note 100.
104
MARKIEWICZ, supra note 92, at Table 1; see also Das, supra note 100.
105
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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according to laws in North Carolina and North Dakota106), as does
the requirements for the information’s encryption, with some state
laws including a “encrypted data safe harbor” for data that is safely
encrypted.107 In California, the statute comes into play only when
the data is not encrypted, but other statutes require notification if
the encryption is broken or the encryption key compromised.108
Who owns enforcement and administration varies, too; the
Florida Department of Legal Affairs collects fines and institutes
proceedings for the civil penalties, while the criminal penalties are
handled by that state’s criminal division.109
F. Congress to the Rescue?
After ChoicePoint, it appeared that Congress might act fast to
pass federal data breach notification legislation, but the topic has
been mired by a variety of different approaches—reflecting the
variety of approaches by the states.110 Legislation has been
proposed and publicized by high-profile lawmakers, among them
California Democratic Sen. Dianne Feinstein, Vermont Democratic
Sen. Patrick Leahy, and Pennsylvania Republican Sen. Arlen
Specter.111 Feinstein’s bill is very similar to the California law,
and interacts with existing state laws by serving as a floor,
allowing the states to go above her proposed legislation, and
explicitly allows for the Federal Trade Commission to impose civil
remedies.112
At least eighteen bills have been introduced in House and
Senate committees, but the issues raised by proposed legislation
are difficult, and influential lobbies have vested interests in the
outcomes (banking and financial concerns among them).113 For
example, allowing consumers to freeze access to their credit
reports is proving controversial. In March 2006, the House
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113

MARKIEWICZ, supra note 92, at Tbl. 1.
Id.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29(a) (2006); MARKIEWICZ, supra note 92, at tbl.1 n.8.
FLA. STAT. § 817.5681(11) (2005).
See Das, supra note 100.
See Lemos, supra note 49.
See Skinner, supra note 55, at 62.
See Waldmeir, supra note 102; Das, supra note 100.
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Financial Services Committee passed a bill with a credit freeze
provision; several members who voted for the bill in committee
said they would need to revisit that aspect if it went before a full
House vote.114 On the federal level, the already-complicated
elements considered by the state legislation above take on even
more dimensions. Other controversial issues include how a federal
law would interact with the existing federal laws, chief among
them the Graham-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA).115
In what may be the best chance for federal legislation, in
February 2007, Leahy and Sen. Bernie Sanders, an Independent
from Vermont, introduced The Personal Data Privacy and Security
Act of 2007, a bill similar to one Specter and Leahy sponsored in
2005.116 The first version was considered by the Senate Judiciary
Committee, but “languished on the Senate calendar for more than a
year.”117 The 2007 bill as proposed has notice provisions, provides
for criminal recourse for improper access to “sensitive personally
identifiable information” (by amending the computer fraud statute,
18 U.S.C. § 1030 (a)(2)), and allows consumers to request from
data brokers the information on file, and to correct any
inaccuracies.118
The proposed bill has carve-outs for information covered by
GLBA and HIPAA, for law enforcement need, for fraudprevention technologies, and for marketing data.119 Companies
holding information on more than 100,000 Americans would be
required to have data privacy and security programs.120 Notice is
required when the risk of harm is “significant,” and there are
criminal penalties for intentionally concealing a breach that would

114

See Stacy Kaper & Rob Blackwell, Data Bill Moves Along, And So Does Freeze
Fight, AMERICAN BANKER, Mar. 17, 2006, at 1.
115
See Das, supra note 96.
116
Statement Of Senator Patrick Leahy, Chairman, Committee On The Judiciary, On
The Introduction Of The Leahy-Specter Personal Data Privacy And Security Act Of
2007, Feb. 6, 2007, available at http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200702/020607.html (last
visited Feb. 14, 2007).
117
Id.
118
The Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2007, available at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/pdsa2005.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2007).
119
Id.
120
Id.
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require notice. In an interesting and gentle nod to data brokers, the
bill asserts that “[d]ata brokers have assumed a significant role in
providing information, authentication, and screening services, and
related data collection and analyses for commercial, nonprofit, and
government operations.”121
The bill limits “[s]ensitive personally identifiable information”
to “electronic or digital form.”122 “Sensitive personally identifiable
information” is defined as first name or first initial and last name
with any one of “Social Security number, driver’s license number,
passport number, or alien registration number” or with two of
“home address or telephone number; mother’s maiden name, if
identified as such; month, day, and year of birth.”123 Additionally,
“biometric data such as a finger print, voice print, a retina or iris
image, or any other unique physical representation,” any account
number and associated code or password that can be used to obtain
anything of value, or a financial account number and any code
needed to get funds or credit also constitute “[s]ensitive personally
identifiable information.”124
Another option to use federal law to address the issues of
privacy would be to strengthen existing legislation, such as
addressing some of the opt-outs in the GLBA.125 Possible opt-outs
that could be limited include the exemptions from notification
about information sharing that results from customer requests, or
account maintenance, or when the sharing is among the financial
institution’s affiliates or partners with whom it has agreements in
place.126 Including data brokers such as Acxiom, Experian and
ChoicePoint under the purview of the GLBA is another option, as
the data broker industry is largely unregulated.
Commentators and privacy experts alike worry that notification
may have the opposite effect from that intended: the
desensitization of consumers. “[O]ver-notification anaesthetizes
people because they feel, this happens all the time, and I didn’t get
121
122
123
124
125
126

Id. § 2, Findings.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Ireland & Howell, supra note 9, at 681–82.
Id.
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hurt by it,” said a senior executive at data security firm RSA
Security, which is advocating federal legislation.127 Acxiom’s
chief privacy officer, Jennifer Barrett, who supports a notification
bill based on a risk of identity theft, shares the concern.128 “It’s
called a cry wolf syndrome,” she said in 2005. “Cry wolf too
many times and people won’t listen.”129
II. BREACHES
A look at some of the major security breaches from the past
few years serves to highlight both the existing remedies that are
being utilized and the room for improvement and experimentation.
This discussion is by no means exhaustive, and suffers from
inconsistent news reporting on criminal trials and a lack of access
to lower court decisions and actual charges brought. Companies
and institutions—especially publicly traded ones, or ones reliant on
the public’s trust—who have experienced a breach and are
working with law enforcement have, despite the growing number
of data breach notification laws, incentives to reduce the attention
on the breach, the questions it raises about their data policies, and
the extent to which customer, client, or student information has
been exposed. This section will categorize personal information
data breaches, offering illustrations of each category: negligence,
crime, low standards, and loss of control. An attempt to establish a
taxonomy of breaches is important in assuring that emerging
legislative, administrative, and industry rules are properly covering
the breadth of the issues. Additionally, it is important to note that
in many cases there is a duality of the approach to punish both the
data attacker and the company that allowed the attack, as
illustrated in the Amy Boyer and ChoicePoint cases.

127

Waldmeir, supra note 102.
Chip Taulbee, Acxiom Lets Congress Know Opinion of Privacy Proposals, ARK.
BUS., Apr. 25, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 8154023 [hereinafter Taulbee, Acxiom
Lets Congress Know].
129
Id.
128
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A. Negligence: Data Brokers Have a Duty of Care
Highlighting much of the consumer discomfort about what
information data brokers hold, how they hold it, and where they
got it from is a 1999 case from New Hampshire.130 Liam Youens
was obsessed with a former high school classmate, Amy Boyer,
and kept a log on a website of his efforts to find her so he could
kill her.131 He knew her address, but not where she worked, so he
turned to the information broker Docusearch.com.132 “It’s accually
[sic] obsene [sic] what you can find out about a person on the
internet,” he wrote on his website.133
Docusearch had
subcontractors working for the company, and provided one of
them, Michele Gambino, with Boyer’s Social Security number and
more. Gambino called Boyer or her mother, and, posing as an
insurance company employee with a refund for overpayment, got
Boyer’s work address from her.134 This practice is called
“pretexting,” and some forms of it were made illegal by the
GLBA.135 For Boyer, it was too late; on October 15, Youens drove
by as she was getting in her car to leave work and shot eleven
bullets into her head and upper body before turning the gun on
himself.136 Docusearch charged Youens $45 for Boyer’s Social
Security number, and $109 for her work address.137 After Boyer’s
murder, a New Hampshire Senator introduced “Amy Boyer’s
Law,” which would limit the use of Social Security numbers.138
Ironically, privacy advocates and industries attacked the
legislation, which did not become law.139

130

Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7952 (D.N.H. Apr. 25, 2002).
Securing Electronic Personal Data Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. (2005) (statement of Robert Douglas, CEO of PrivacyToday.com).
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id. See also Electronic Privacy Information Center, The Amy Boyer Case,
http://epic.org/privacy/boyer/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2007) (providing a background of the
case and the relevant claims) [hereinafter The Amy Boyer Case].
135
See 15 U.S.C. § 6821 (2006). See also The Amy Boyer Case, supra note 134.
136
Testimony of Robert Douglas, supra note 131.
137
The Amy Boyer Case, supra note 134.
138
Lemos, supra note 49.
139
Id.
131
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The Boyer case is not the only situation in which data brokers
have given out information to stalkers resulting in tragic
consequences; actress Theresa Saldana was stabbed and slashed in
March 1992 by a stalker who got her home address from a private
investigator who called Saldana’s mother impersonating Martin
Scorsese’s assistant, and claiming to be looking for Saldana to
discuss a role.140
In 1989, actress Rebecca Schaeffer was murdered by a stalker
who got her home address from a private investigator using the
California motor vehicles database.141 The Schaeffer case is
credited with sparking the passage of the Drivers’ Privacy
Protection Act.142 Prior to the passage of that law, states had made
millions of dollars auctioning off their motor vehicle and driver’s
license records. Colorado earned about $4.4 million, Florida’s
price was $33 million, and New York made $17 million in a
year.143
The Boyer case, however, was different from the Schaeffer
incident in that Amy Boyer’s mother, on behalf of her estate, sued
Docusearch and the subcontractor Gambino. The New Hampshire
Supreme Court said in February 2003 that data brokers and private
investigators have a legal duty to exercise reasonable care if the
information they sell about a person creates a risk, and that stalking
and identity theft constitute foreseeable harms that would give rise
to this duty.144 “This is especially true when, as in this case, the
investigator does not know the client or the client’s purpose in
seeking the information[,]” the court said.145
In what EPIC called “a significant expansion of privacy
protection” exceeding Gramm-Leach-Bliley’s provisions,146 the
New Hampshire Supreme Court said that the state’s Consumer
140

Testimony of Robert Douglas, supra note 131.
Id. (noting that the Shaeffer murder led to the passage of the Drivers Privacy
Protection Act).
142
Solove & Hoofnagle, Model Regime, supra note 16, at 376.
143
Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the
Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1150 (2002).
144
Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001, 1004–05, 1007 (N.H. 2003).
145
See id. at 1008.
146
EPIC Litigation Docket, available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/litigation/ (last
visited Jan. 7, 2007).
141
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Protection Act allows a private cause of action by the individual
who was deceived against a private investigator or information
broker for damages caused by the sale of information obtained by a
pretextual phone call.147 The court also said that getting an
individual’s Social Security number from a credit reporting agency
without the person’s knowledge or permission and selling it to a
client may also provide a cause of action for damages.148
B. Crime: ChoicePoint and Acxiom
1. ChoicePoint
Choicepoint is perhaps the world’s biggest data broker, holding
19 billion records in its databases, many of which have come from
smaller data brokers that it has bought during its first seven years
in business.149 In its second significant breach, but the first to
receive massive media attention, the commercial data aggregator
ChoicePoint reported that 50 business clients to whom it had been
selling data were not who they claimed but instead fraudulent
entities set up entirely to collect data, and that the data the
businesses received had been used in about 50 cases of identity
theft.150 The first breach, in 2002, involved about $1 million of
fraud “in the form of identity theft.”151 In the later breach, early
reports put the number of consumers affected at 145,000, but the
Federal Trade Commission said that the number reached more than
160,000.152 A 2003 California law requiring the notification of

147

See Remsburg, 816 A.2d at 1005, 1010–11.
See id. at 1004–05.
149
Tom Zeller Jr., Breach Points Up Flaws in Privacy Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2005,
at C1 [hereinafter Zeller, Breach Points Up Flaws]. See also Bender, Privacy
developments, supra note 48, at n.15. This data includes “current and previous address,
credit data, employment history, motor vehicle data, police data, assets, insurance claims,
and professional license data.”
150
Bender, Privacy Developments, supra note 48; Tom Zeller Jr., U.S. Settles with
Company on Leak of Consumers’ Data, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2006, at C3 [hereinafter
Zeller, U.S. Settles]. A ChoicePoint official disagreed with the claims of 800 identity
thefts, saying the number he was aware of was sixteen. Id.
151
Bender, Privacy Developments, supra note 48.
152
Zeller, U.S. Settles, supra note 150. An additional 17,000 people were notified in
November 2005 that their data was included. Solove & Hoofnagle, Model Regime, supra
148
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breaches by companies holding information on California residents
is credited with bringing the breach to light.153 Initially, the
company at first notified only the 35,000 California residents
whose data might have been compromised; when questions arose
about other state residents, the company was forced to reveal the
breadth of the issue.154
The ChoicePoint breach also brought to the public’s attention
the data broker industry, and “invited a national debate.”155
Indicative of the growing broker business, ChoicePoint numbers
among its clients “insurance agencies and corporate employee
screeners, check-cashing companies, media outlets . . . , private
investigators, law enforcement officials and even the United States
government” as well as offering inexpensive public records
information to everyone.156 The data is used for background
checks for employers, tenant and drug screenings, checking for
mortgage fraud, and searching for shareholders.157
The FTC fined the Alpharetta, Georgia, based ChoicePoint $10
million and required the company to set aside a $5 million fund for
consumer compensation.158
The FTC complaint said that
ChoicePoint failed to notice “obvious red flags” in applications
from the fraudulent businesses.159 Because the data included
highly regulated credit history data, the company was potentially in
violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, though the FTC
settlement is not an acknowledgement of any wrongdoing.160
Other class-action suits have been filed in addition to the
Goldberg class-action suit mentioned above. In at least two of
them, the would-be plaintiffs claim that ChoicePoint, which spun
off from Equifax, was indeed a consumer reporting agency, and
note 16, at 358 n.1 (citing Michael Hiltzik, Big Data Broker Eyes DMV Records, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 1, 2005, at C1).
153
Amanda Bronstad, ChoicePoint Case Highlights Evolution of Identity Theft, L.A.
BUS. J., Sept. 19, 2005, at 6.
154
Zeller, Breach Points Up Flaws, supra note 149.
155
See generally, Solove & Hoofnagle, Model Regime, supra note 16, at 368.
156
Zeller, Breach Points Up Flaws, supra note 149.
157
Bronstad, supra note 153.
158
Zeller, U.S. Settles, supra note 150.
159
Id.
160
Id.
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hence should be governed by the federal and state laws that apply
to that industry, especially the ones that require a company to be
certain of the other entities to which it is selling data.161
2. The Crimes behind ChoicePoint
What took place in the ChoicePoint case was a modern version
of the classic dumpster diving schemes, where thieves would look
through garbage for information with which to open new credit
lines. Starting in March 2000, the brother-sister duo of Adedayo
and Bibiana Benson opened a series of accounts with ChoicePoint,
and used those accounts to get thousands of identifying numbers
from ChoicePoint.162 The Bensons, as well as at least one other
man, obtained credit data from ChoicePoint, after opening
accounts using forged business documents.163
The Bensons then opened credit and bank accounts, including
cell phone accounts, using the names of the people ChoicePoint
had released to them.164 They also resold the data to others.165
Bibiana was charged in 2002, and her brother in late 2004; the
cases ended in March 2005, and both are serving federal prison
sentences of more than four years each.166 The other man, Olatunji
Oluwatosin, was charged in August 2005 of operating similar
schemes and was sentenced to ten years in prison and $6.5 million
in restitution.167 Oluwatosin pleaded guilty to “conspiracy to
commit computer access fraud and grand theft.”168
ChoicePoint has been criticized for the delay in revealing the
breach, as well as the fact that the company was giving data out
based merely on the applicant having a business license; the
company claims it has changed this practice and now has agents

161

Bond, supra note 2.
Bronstad, supra note 153.
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
Business Briefs: Identity Theft Results in a 10-Year Sentence, N.Y. TIMES, Feb 11,
2006, at C2.
168
Id. There is mention of at least one more defendant in the case, an “Encino man,”
but he is not named in news reports. See Brondstad, supra note 153.
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visit businesses before the company reveals “sensitive personally
identifiable information.”169
There is an additional irony in this particular breach:
ChoicePoint is only one among several commercial data brokers
who work with the government and law enforcement agencies to
aggregate data.170 But ChoicePoint’s breach raises many questions
about the sorts of information and how much access government
entities have to data stored at these brokers.171
These issues, which include the security of the access to the
databases, the protocols in place for the government employees
who have access to the information—estimated to include tens of
thousands of federal law enforcement agents172—and the breadth
of the information itself, have been the subject of Electronic
Privacy Information Center requests under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA).173
The FOIA requests include
ChoicePoint, but also cover LexisNexis, Experian, Dun &
Bradstreet, and Database Technologies Online.174 The requests
have revealed that security measures in place tend to favor the
protection of the agencies, not the individuals whose information
the databases are housing.175
3. Acxiom
At Acxiom, one hacker led authorities to another, much more
nefarious one. Federal authorities said that Daniel Baas of
Milford, Ohio, was just “hacking for kicks” when he intruded into
the company’s systems and took millions of records on individuals,

169

Bronstad, supra note 153.
See Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers: How Choicepoint and Other
Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package Your Data for Law Enforcement,
29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 595, 599 (2004) [hereinafter Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s
Little Helpers].
171
See id. at 599–618.
172
Id. at 607.
173
See id. at 595–600. See also http://www.epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/ (last visited
Jan. 8, 2007) for the documents which have been released and for the status of the
pending requests.
174
Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers, supra note 170, at 599.
175
Id. at 610.
170
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which he stored on disks he kept at his home.176 Baas was working
as a systems administrator for one of Acxiom’s clients,
Cincinnati’s Market Intelligence Group, when he downloaded
about 300 passwords, including an administrative one, and
accessed data from other Acxiom customers from December 2002
to January 2003.177 In March 2005, Baas started serving a fortyfive month federal prison sentence for the intrusions, which were
estimated to cost Acxiom $5.8 million.178
But in the discovery for their prosecution of Baas, investigators
found a trail left by Scott Levine, whose theft of more than one
billion records eclipsed Baas’ activities.179 From about January
through July 2003, Levine got access to an Acxiom server by using
what the Department of Justice called “sophisticated decryption
software” to illegally obtain passwords.180
Levine who is alternatively described as an “online
advertiser”181 and the owner of a “corporation engaged in the
business of distributing advertisements over the Internet to email
addresses[,]”182 had a previous run-in with the Securities and
Exchange Commission, which alleged he sold unregistered
securities targeted at Florida’s senior citizens.183 At the time of the
Acxiom breach, Levine was the owner of Boca Raton, Floridabased Snipermail.com, a bulk emailer.184 One news report said
that his initial access came from a client Snipermail and Acxiom
had in common who gave his company the FTP password.185
176

Acxiom Case Sends Message (Commentary), ARK. BUS., Feb. 27, 2006 [hereinafter
Acxiom Case Sends Message]; Chip Taulbee, Trial To Rehash Acxiom’s, Hackers Past,
ARK. BUS., July 11, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 12588914 [hereinafter Taulbee, Trial
To Rehash].
177
Taulbee, Trial To Rehash, supra note 176.
178
Acxiom Case Sends Message, supra note 176; Taulbee, Acxiom Lets Congress Know,
supra note 128.
179
Acxiom Case Sends Message, supra note 176. See also Press Release, Dep’t of Just.,
Former Officer of Internet Company Sentenced in Case of Massive Data Theft from
Acxiom Corporation (Feb. 22, 2006), 06-088, available at 2006 WL 416250 [hereinafter
Press Release, Dep’t of Just.].
180
Press Release, Dep’t of Just., supra note 179.
181
Acxiom Case Sends Message, supra note 176.
182
Press Release, Dep’t of Just., supra note 179.
183
Taulbee, Trial To Rehash, supra note 176.
184
Id.
185
Id.
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Using that password, he and other Snipermail employees were able
to access other files from other Acxiom clients, and then ran
programs to decrypt other usernames and passwords.186 In the end,
Levine and Snipermail stole more than eight gigabytes of
information, some of which was resold to other Snipermail client
“spammers[,]” making his entry a peer among the larger known
intrusions.187
Levine’s download and subsequent resale of those records led
to his conviction in an August 2005 jury trial on “120 counts of
unauthorized access of a protected computer, two counts of access
device fraud, and one count of obstruction of justice,” for which he
was sentenced to ninety-six months in federal prison.188 Acxiom
estimated that the Levine intrusion cost the company at least
$7 million.189 Acxiom’s data security methodologies were also
criticized widely after the breach and the stock price suffered.190
In 2005 testimony in front of a Congressional committee
considering federal privacy regulation, Acxiom’s privacy officer
said that none of the files accessed in either breach resulted in
identity theft.191 The Acxiom official line supports a federal
privacy legislation that prevents state action on the issue, but only
one that limits notification to situations where there is a real
chance that identity theft will ensue.192
The Wall Street Journal reported that Acxiom’s initial
interpretation of the California breach notification law made the
company responsible only for notification of its clients—the
retailers for whom it manages databases—and not the California
consumers.193 The company’s logic, which was criticized by
privacy advocates, was that the data belonged to the retailers.194
186

Id.
Id.
188
Press Release, Dep’t of Just., supra note 179.
189
See Taulbee, Acxiom Lets Congress Know, supra note 128.
190
See Taulbee, Trial To Rehash, supra note 176.
191
See Taulbee, Acxiom Lets Congress Know, supra note 128.
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See id.
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Dionne Searcey, Information Security; Consumer Alert: In 2003, California Passed
Its Security Breach Notice Law; Its Effect Has Extended Well Beyond the State, WALL
ST. J., July 18, 2005, at R6.
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See id.
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C. Low Standards: Other Lax Security Practices
The Federal Trade Commission has filed at least nine actions
against companies whose security practices resulted in
compromised customer data. At least one of them was a complaint
about the company’s information security policies; many of the
others, including complaints against Gateway Learning Corp.
(2004), Eli Lily (2002), Microsoft (2002), and Guess? (2003), were
based on allegations that the company did not do what the privacy
policy promised that it was doing to protect customer
information.195
Eliot Spitzer, New York’s Attorney General at the time,
reached an agreement with the online arm of lingerie retailer
Victoria’s Secret, where the retailer agreed to a fine of $50,000 for
exposing the orders, names, and addresses of more than 560
customers.196 “The consumer protection laws of the 1930’s have
become the privacy law of the 21st century,” Spitzer told the New
York Times.197
D. Loss of Control: Lost and Stolen
Stolen laptops comprise another—and seemingly endlessly
reported—category of data breaches. Wells Fargo, Motorola,
MCI, a large number of universities, blood banks, and medical
centers have reported losses.198 Backup tapes went missing from
Time Warner, the Bank of America, and Ameritrade, among
others. 199 The scorecard is not comforting and does not reflect
learning from prior events. The University of Colorado had four
instances of lost tapes in 2005; Michigan State University had
three.200

195

See Dreifach, supra note 54, at 417.
See John Schwartz, Victoria’s Secret Reaches a Data Privacy Settlement, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 21, 2003, at C14.
197
Id.
198
See Bender, Privacy Developments, supra note 48, at 15.
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See id.
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See Identity Theft Resource Center Reports 104 Security Breaches Since January 1st
Is Anyone Hearing An Alarm Bell Yet?, PR NEWSWIRE, Sept. 6, 2005.
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E. Two Additional Considerations
1. Is Harm Necessary?
Harm is a troublesome element in looking at the privacy
legislation put forth by the states.201 At least one commentator
says that the role of harm—or the requirement of particular types
or levels of harm—is far from settled in private claims regarding
privacy violations.202 As an example, he cites the case of a local
pharmacy that was sold to the CVS chain, which required as a
condition of the sale that pharmacy records be transferred and that
customers not be notified until after the sale.203 As a result, a
class-action suit was filed against the pharmacies.204 The plaintiff,
an AIDS patient, claimed he used the independent pharmacy for
almost twenty years precisely because he expected his information
to be handled confidentially. The court said that, although “actual
injury” is required by the New York General Business law in play,
that injury did not need to be “pecuniary,” apparently accepting the
plaintiff’s assertion that the loss of the right to privacy was an
adequate harm, one that was lost as a result of the intentional
practices of CVS.205
2. Mixed Messages from Washington
Meanwhile, at the same time that Congress and state
lawmakers are seeking to protect consumers with more legislation
at both levels, other governmental actors are moving in the
opposite direction. In two stark examples of the amount and
variety of information held on consumers, changes to IRS and
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
enforcement appear to be on the horizon. The IRS has quietly
revealed that it is considering allowing tax preparers to sell
201

See supra Part I.E.
Dreifach, supra note 54, at 416.
203
Id. (discussing Anonymous v. CVS Corp., 188 Misc. 2d 616 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001)).
204
CVS, 188 Misc. 2d at 616.
205
Id. at 624. “To plead a claim for violation of General Business Law § 349, a plaintiff
must allege that (1) defendant’s acts have broad impact on consumers at large;
(2) defendant is engaged in deceptive practices; and (3) this practice has injured
plaintiff[.]” Id.
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information gathered from tax returns.206 In response, however,
forty-six Attorneys General from the states and the District of
Columbia have submitted formal opposition to the change, instead
suggesting a ban on the sharing of taxpayer information.207 In the
summer of 2005, HIPAA rule-making changes were announced
that reduced the criminal liability of individual employees in
doctor’s offices.208 In March 2006, the House Financial Services
Committee passed the Financial Data Protection Act, which, if
enacted, would reduce the level of consumer protection in state
laws.209

206

Jeff Gelles, IRS Plans to Allow Preparers To Sell Data, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 21,
2006, at A01, available at 2006 WLNR 4628551.
207
Federal, State Officials Object to Proposed IRS Rules, EPIC ALERT, Vol. 13.07,
Apr. 6, 2006, available at http://www.epic.org/alert/EPIC_Alert_13.07.html. EPIC has
been critical of the IRS and its security, as is a broader Government Accountability
Office report released in April 2006 that gave many federal agencies poor reports. Id.
Security problems include:
IRS’s physical security controls (restricting physical access to computer
facilities and resources); software patch management; and electronic access
controls such as passwords, user rights and file permissions. The IRS also has
had considerable trouble with its contractors improperly accessing and
collecting sensitive taxpayer data. In one case, an IRS contractor spent several
months collecting political party affiliation data on taxpayers in 20 states, in
violation of the law. Id.
208
See Amy Snow Landa, HIPAA Memo Could Affect Doctors’ Criminal Liability,
AMERCIAN MEDICAL NEWS, Jul. 18, 2005, available at http://www.amaassn.org/amednews/2005/07/18/gvsb0718.htm (referencing to Memorandum from
Timothy J.Coleman, Senior Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General to Alex M. Aza II,
General Counsel, Department of Health and Human Services, Re: Scope of Criminal
Enforcement Under 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6, June 1, 2005, available at
http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/pdf/hipaa_opinion_06_01_2005.pdf ); see also David
V. Marshall, Justice Department Limits Prosecution Under HIPAA, Davis Wright
Tremaine LLP Advisory Bulletin, http://www.dwt.com/practc/hc_ecom/bulletins/06-2905_ProsecutionLimits.htm, (referencing Memorandum from Timothy J. Coleman, Senior
Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General to Alex M. Aza II, General Counsel, Department
of Health and Human Services, Re: Scope of Criminal Enforcement Under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320d-6, June 1, 2005, available at http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/pdf/hipaa_
opinion_06_01_2005.pdf).
209
House Committee Approves Bill to Weaken Data Breach Laws, EPIC ALERT,
Vol. 13.06, Mar. 24, 2006, available at http://www.epic.org/alert/EPIC_Alert_
13.06.html. H.R. 3997 is just one of the data security bills under consideration, some
stronger and some weaker than the state laws.
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III. THE TOOLS ARE MANY
The examples mentioned above invoke tort and due care
considerations;
state
consumer
protection
legislation;
administrative actions by the FTC; class action lawsuits, including
one where no tangible harm has been suffered; computer fraud
statutes; grand theft charges; the Freedom of Information Act;
unauthorized access statutes; access device fraud; and obstruction
of justice charges. These are all real tools used by prosecutors and
other governmental agents, privacy advocates, consumer groups,
and individuals whose data has been compromised. These tools
are separately imperfect, but together comprise a net that needs
further investigation and testing before an overarching federal law
can provide safety for consumer information.
Additional theoretical approaches are mentioned in the
literature. Tort theories that can be available to victims include
trespass to chattels, conversion, and intrusion.210
Several
commentators support a response based in a tort of privacy.211
There is an increasing movement toward the recognition of a duty
to protect information, with scholars suggesting the utilization of a
variety of existing remedies in tort law and in traditional business
law for those who fail to exercise proper care, in addition to the
existing federal and state laws.212 One commentator says that if we
do not already expect two new duties from companies, they soon
will be expected to fulfill even more explicitly duties “to provide
reasonable security for their corporate data and information
systems; and . . . to disclose security breaches to those who may be
adversely affected by such breaches.”213 Another commentator
warns of liability for directors whose companies fail to ensure
customer and employee privacy as a possible violation of the

210

Johnson, supra note 8, at 259.
See generally McClurg, supra note 39 (suggesting that the privacy tort of
appropriation should be available as a remedy in situations of “invasive consumer data
profiling”).
212
See generally Johnson, supra note 8; McClurg, supra note 39.
213
Thomas J. Smedinghoff, The New Law of Information Security: What Companies
Need To Do Now, 22 NO. 11 COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW. 9, 9 (2005).
211

GARCIA_FORMATTED_032707

726

3/27/2007 2:28:14 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

Vol. XVII

business judgment rule and the subsequent basis for shareholders’
derivative suits.214
IV. CONCLUSION
To avoid nefarious and extreme legislation, companies need to
make it regularly occurring business practices to take care of their
customer data. For instance, though the California law covers only
breaches involving unencrypted data; an advisory article suggests
that companies would then be wise “to encrypt the personal
information of its customers (or employees)” in order to avoid
most of the explicit liability in the law.215 “Companies might also
wish to consider installing firewalls and other software
applications to guard their computer databases—particularly those
containing ‘personal information’ of consumers or employees[,]”
the piece goes on, offering advice that seems a sub-floor of what
would constitute good business practices.216 Just like offline data
would be stored in locked file cabinets to safeguard it, businesses,
schools, and government agencies need to realize that the trust of
their customers, students, and employees can very easily be eroded
by a lack of protection. Data protection is not just one way to
follow the law, it makes for good business.217
In seeking to be made whole or to punish individuals for
malicious use of others’ data, myriad tools are available to both
individual consumers as well as governmental enforcement
entities. State laws are beginning to address the remedies at the
roots of the malady, the laissez-faire attitudes of some companies
and agencies about data security and protection, and a marketplace
with many different approaches is a robust test of what the best
remedies will be at this still-nascent point in the development of
electronic data storage. It is far too premature to determine the
best methods for ensuring the protection of consumer data, and the
states should be allowed to continue to experiment to generate new
ideas, testing the range of state laws against the ongoing breaches.
214
215
216
217

INTERNATIONAL GUIDE TO PRIVACY, supra note 26, at 142–43.
Paetkau & Torabian-Bashardoust, supra note 44, at 41.
Id.
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The cost of a breach in business lost and in goodwill tarnished is
far greater than the costs of compliance with the various laws,
which simply encourage good data practices and responsible
treatment of consumers.
Justice Brandeis said that “[i]t is one of the happy incidents of
the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”218 That is
certainly mandated by the issue of privacy protection.

218

New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

